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Abstract
Drawing on the agenda-setting and framing literature, this quantitative content analysis
examines how le Figaro, the Daily Telegraph, the New York Times, and the Moscow Times the
Syrian war before and after the chemical weapon attack of 21 August 2013. Overall, the
nationalization frame was most frequent, followed by the responsibility and conflict
frames. Despite the large impact of the conflict, the morality, human interest, and
economic impact frames were hardly present. Although all newspapers followed a
similar pattern, the Daily Telegraph was the most heavily framed. Moreover, the stories
barely provided any context while discussing several solutions largely in keeping with
the suggestions of the governments. These findings raise questions about the neutrality
of the newspapers and their impact on public opinion.
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Introduction
The year 2011 was a momentous year for the Middle East and North Africa, as an
unprecedented wave of protests—the ‘Arab Spring’—shook the foundations of
many regimes in the region (Bellin, 2013; Eminue and Dickson, 2013). In
January 2011, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gave an interview to the Wall
Street Journal, stating that his government was ‘strongly linked to the beliefs of
the people’ and would not be affected by the troubles other countries were under-
going (Wall Street Journal, 31.01.2011). But Assad spoke too soon: a few weeks
later the Syrian people revolted against their President. Since March 2011, Syria
has been in the throes of a civil war between government and opposition, with the
emergence of extremist groups complicating the situation even more.
To keep abreast of this ever-changing and bloody conflict, people deal with a
second hand reality that is structured by what journalists tell them about the situ-
ations and people involved. As the public cannot firsthand experience these and most
other events, the quantity and quality of the media coverage is of utmost importance.
Mass media, however, do not report about everything that is going on in the world:
they focus our attention on specific topics, which we as a result view as important.
They do not only say what we have to think about, they also influence how we think
about these topics by highlighting some elements while downplaying others. The goal
of this study is to assess the coverage of the Syrian crisis in terms of quantity and
quality (attention and tone) in the months before and after Syria’s use of chemical
weapons against its own population, in August 2013. We shall focus on six generic
frames as well as on diagnoses and solutions put forward and search for potential
differences between American, British, French, and Russian news articles.
Theoretical framework
Setting the scene: War in Syria
In March 2011 the popular movement dubbed ‘the Arab Spring’ reached Syria,
with the hinterland town of Daraa being the first to stir. A few young boys scrawled
some anti-regime graffiti on the walls and were arrested. When they finally came
home, it was clear they had been abused and tortured (Ajami, 2012). Such abuse
and subsequent ill-treatment of demonstrators sparked many marches and pro-
tests. In addition, the protest movement demanded ‘the release of political pris-
oners, broader political representation, free media, more human rights and the
overall overthrow of the Assad regime’ (Eminue and Dickson, 2013: 5). Despite
nominal reforms and owing to the regime’s repression of the first protests, a cycle
of violence was set in motion, spreading the revolution throughout the country.
Since 2011 various rebel forces, government troops and radical Islamists have been
locked into a vicious war. With more than 470,000 deaths in February 2016 the
Syrian conflict has become the bloodiest of all Arab Spring revolutions (Eminue
and Dickson, 2013; Lewis, 2016).
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Before the air strikes carried out since mid-2014 by a ‘coalition of the willing’ led
by the United States (US) and those conducted by Russia, the international com-
munity disagreed on potential intervention. While the European Union (EU) and
the US condemned the authoritarian regime, its brutal repression and human rights
violations, they barely left a mark on the conflict in 2013. The EU supported
political efforts to find a negotiated solution, but was essentially waging an
economic war against Assad because one-quarter of Syria’s trade was with the
EU. Concerning military action, there was no unified, goal-oriented European
plan1 (EU Commission, 2013; Lesch, 2011; Seeberg, 2012). The White House
also stressed it wanted a negotiated settlement and imposed financial sanctions,
but was threatening with and preparing military plans as well. However, until
September 2013 Western pressure was largely offset by Russia and China, which
continued to shield the Assad regime. President Putin diplomatically supported
Assad and bolstered Syria with military supplies on strategic, political, and
economic grounds (Eminue and Dickson, 2013; Sharp and Blanchard, 2013;
Tabler, 2013).
In August 2013, United Nations (UN) inspectors proved that toxic chemicals
had killed some 1,429 Syrians (including 426 children) in the suburbs of Damascus
in the largest chemical attack since Saddam Hussein gassed Iraqui Kurds in 1988.
There is evidence, though not conclusive, that the regime has used such chemical
weapons in addition to conventional weapons to regain ground (Sharp and
Blanchard, 2013). This attack produced a wave of reactions around the world,
strengthening Obama’s military resolve. On 14 September, US Secretary of State
John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reached an agreement on
quarantining and destroying Syria’s chemical arsenal. This very turbulent time rife
with risks of escalation is the focus of this study. It is worth noting that the
situation has become more complex with the rise of ISIS, which changed the
great powers’ responses and caused Cold War lines to reappear (Cozma and
Kozman, 2015).
As is clear from this overview of the Syrian conflict, the (US), Russia, and—to a
lesser extent-the EU (represented by key players France and Great Britain) played
a pivotal role. Therefore, we elected to analyze articles from one of the leading
newspapers in each of these countries. This outline of crucial events and geopolit-
ical stances is also vital for a framing analysis because of the major impact the
political structure has on the media’s conflict coverage (Wolfsfeld, 1997). In this
study, we assess the way news articles presented the conflict and attempt to connect
our results with the geopolitical stances of the countries of publication. However,
the scope of this study is limited as it only focuses on one single quality newspaper
per country during a specific period.
Agenda-setting and framing
In the case of many international topics, citizens have to deal with a second hand
reality structured by mediated information. In other words, media outlets play a
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key role in keeping the public informed. However, these mass media do not signal
the occurrence of all world events owing to time and space limits. One of the most
important claims about news in the mass media is the agenda-setting hypothesis, a
somewhat inadvertent by-product of the necessity to focus on a few topics in
the news. Editors and journalists enjoy a large degree of freedom in deciding
what is newsworthy and what is not, and their choices affect the perception of citi-
zens as to what is relevant and the extent of such relevance (Larcinese et al., 2011;
McCombs, 2005).
Without denying the complexity of the issue, the use of the agenda-setting power
is arguably one of the most influential behaviors of news media—especially if they
use this power to suppress information. Theoretical models by Anderson and
McLaren (2012), Bernhardt et al. (2008), and Besley and Prat (2006) show how
this can affect both policy and public decisions, and possibly lead to suboptimal
ones (Larcinese et al., 2011). The power of agenda-setting in shaping readers’ views
on the importance of a topic is such that we asked ourselves the following
questions:
RQ1a: How much attention is paid to the Syrian war in terms of the amount of
published articles, their length, and the page of publication?
RQ1b: Are there differences in the newspapers’ attention to the Syrian war?
Besides selecting the topics to cover, journalists have the ability to choose the tone
of their reporting. This is what we call framing: framing revolves around how
information is presented in public discourse. The concept has been one of the
most fertile research areas in social and cognitive psychology (Kahnemann and
Tversky, 1981), linguistics and discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1977), sociology
(Goffman, 1974), journalism, communication, and media studies (Scheufele,
1999), political communication, political sciences, and policy studies (Entman,
1993). Therefore, there is a wide variety of definitions, frame types and methods
applied in the framing literature (Matthes, 2009). Robert Entman’s definition is by
far the most widely quoted—although it breeds conceptual vagueness owing to its
breadth (Scheufele and Iyengar, 2012). Entman argued the following:
Framing is to ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, a
causal interpretation, a moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation’ for the
item described. (Entman, 1993: 52, emphasis in the original)
Reporters can select and omit features, and make them more salient by means of
key words, stock phrases, adjectives, repetition, visuals, and/or association with
culturally familiar symbols. By framing issues in a particular way, the media may
shape the public opinion and with it, the public agenda (De Vreese, 2005;
d’Haenens, 2005). Framing effects research is based on the assumption that the
way something is portrayed in the news can affect human perception and change a
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person’s judgment on that issue by making information more visible, meaningful,
or memorable. The notion of framing thus implies a widespread effect on large
portions of the receiving audiences, though it is not likely to have a universal effect
on all (Entman, 1993; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Thus, the mass media may
not only be successful in telling us what to think about something, but they may
also be stunningly successful in telling us how to think about it.
Generic news frames. In order to know how news influences audiences’ interpretation
of facts, we have to analyze the way the facts are reported in the first place. Hence,
this study scrutinizes the news frames used—the outcome of the production or
frame-building process (De Vreese, 2005). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) made
a distinction between issue-specific and generic frames. While issue-specific frames
apply to a certain issue, subject or topic, generic frames typically describe structural
aspects and general features of news that can apply across different topics, times
and cultural contexts. Since incomparability is a major limitation of issue-specific
frames, we believe that the identification of generic frames (not limited to a given
topic) is more valuable for this study (d’Haenens, 2005). This study therefore
focuses on six clearly distinguished generic frames with sufficient representational
validity (De Vreese, 2005) postulated by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) and by
Van Cauwenberge et al. (2009): the conflict, human interest, economic impact, mor-
ality, responsibility, and nationalization frames. Literature seems to point out such
commonly used generic frames when focusing on the portrayal of EU affairs. We
wonder whether this still holds true with another topic in an international context:
how generic are those generic frames2?
The first frame, the conflict frame, highlights a conflict between individuals,
groups, institutions and/or countries in the hope of capturing audiences interest
(Valkenburg et al., 1999; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). Scholars found that
conflict is such a valuable audience attractor (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) and it is
often the most frequently applied frame in foreign news coverage (e.g., De Vreese,
2005; Hamdy and Gooma, 2012; Neuman et al., 1992; Patterson, 1993). Owing to
this systematic emphasis on conflict, the news media have been criticized for adding
to public cynicism and mistrust of political leaders (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997).
The human-interest frame is more regularly found in tabloids striving to capture
and retain more public attention (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2009). Specific to this
frame is an individual’s story or an emphasis on emotions, which adds to the
narrative quality of the news. The issue is personalized and dramatized to create
an emotional response in consumers based on their own experience (Cho and
Gower, 2006). In other words, it brings a ‘human face’ to the news (De Vreese
et al., 1999; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 95). The economic impact frame pre-
sents an event or problem in terms of its economic repercussions on an individual, a
group, an institution, a region, or a country. Stressing the breadth of an event’s
impact makes the potential economic impact clear to the public, who can react
accordingly. Because of this relevance, the economic impact frame is used quite
frequently (Valkenburg et al., 1999; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). The morality
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frame puts the topic in the context of religious tenets or moral prescriptions.
Apparent objectivity being a prime requirement in journalism, news story often
refer indirectly to moral frames, for instance by quoting someone (Neuman et al.,
1992; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). The responsibility frame attributes respon-
sibility to specific political governmental institutions, groups, or individuals for
causing or solving a problem. It shapes public understanding by assigning credit
and blame. lyengar (1991), for instance, argued that television news encourages
people to offer explanations for problems and blame certain actors for it. Finally,
the nationalization frame illustrates a tendency to look at a foreign issue from a
purely national point of view—a time-honored approach in journalism (Gleissner
and De Vreese, 2005). This frame highlights a connection between the topic and the
country or ideas of national politicians, parties, and/or persons. Previous studies
revealed the clear presence of a domestic angle in international news reporting (Van
Cauwenberge et al., 2009). Additionally, ethnocentrism—judging other countries
by the extent to which they live up to one’s own national practices and values—has
always been a crucial value determining the coverage of foreign news (Gans, 1979).
In the case of the Syrian conflict journalists can choose to focus only on the
actual fighting or the opposing goals of the government and rebels or various
international stakeholders, but they can also highlight human situations and suf-
fering (e.g., victims of the crisis), its economic impact (e.g., impact on oil prices,
financial contributions/sanctions, cost of intervention), the morality of the actual
actions (e.g., gassing people including children), point fingers towards those
responsible for the crisis or its resolution (e.g., what can the international commu-
nity or the countries involved do?), or they can focus on a connection with their
own country (e.g., Obama’s leading role). Thus, we ask ourselves:
RQ2a: Which news frames do the newspapers frequently apply?
RQ2b: Are there any differences between the four newspapers in terms of applied
frames?
Diagnostic and prognostic news frames. Besides choosing a specific angle from which to
present media content, journalists should also inform the audience about the larger
social, economic, or political context. Lacking such context, the public will focus
on isolated events and individuals, without understanding the bigger picture. This
is in keeping with Benford and Snow’s diagnostic and prognostic frames (2000), as
well as lyengar’s thematic framing (1991). When journalists frame an issue themat-
ically, they emphasize the broader trends, the social context, and the origins of the
problem. In other words they provide the audience with diagnostic frames: ‘a
diagnosis of some event or aspect of life as troublesome and in need of change’
(Snow et al., 2007: 3). Diagnostic framing involves assignment of blame or caus-
ality (the root of the problem)—adding context to a story. In addition to diagnoses,
journalists can offer solutions for the problems to their audiences. This ‘articulation
of a proposed solution to the problem’ was conceptualized as prognostic framing
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by Snow et al. (2007: 3). Such solutions include at least a plan of attack and frame-
consistent strategies for carrying it out. It addresses the question of what is to be
done and refers to remedial strategies or solutions to the problem (Bell and Messer,
2010). It is important to distinguish between the responsibility frame on the one
hand and the diagnostic/prognostic frames on the other hand: while the former
focuses on general responsibilities and mentions any possible solution, diagnostic/
prognostic framing emphasizes detailed external factors and specific solutions.
By providing diagnoses and prognoses for a conflict, a reporter can ensure that
the public is connecting the issue to specific causes and solutions. Since the Syrian
conflict started as a social movement, it mostly sought to alter a problematic situ-
ation. This gave journalists plenty of possibilities to go beyond descriptive coverage
and add context by offering plausible causes, responsibilities, and solutions. Such
diagnostic and certainly prognostic ways of framing enduring conflicts are crucial
because the stakes are extremely high. The way journalists give meaning to the
Syrian war in general and the chemical attack in particular may promote a
retaliatory or reconciliatory attitude within the general public (including policy-
makers), encouraging either escalation of the conflict or peaceful transitions
towards stability (Cozma and Kozman, 2015). Since framing could be effective
in shaping readers’ thoughts and opinion, we ask ourselves:
RQ3a: Which diagnoses do the newspapers frequently suggest?
RQ3b: Are there any differences between the four newspapers in terms of proposed
diagnoses?
RQ4a: Which prognoses do the newspapers frequently suggest?
RQ4b: Are there any differences between the four newspapers in terms of proposed
prognoses?
Method
We conducted a deductive quantitative content analysis on four months’ worth of
news coverage of the Syrian conflict (i.e., July – October 2013). Articles were col-
lected from American, British, French, and Russian quality newspapers as those
four countries were politically the most involved in the conflict. Our sample
includes Western European views as well as perspectives from non-EU countries
with important political ties to Syria. We chose quality dailies owing to their influ-
ential and in-depth political coverage, their ability to lead and affect the public
and political agenda, and their more diverse political stances and journalistic
perspectives (Brosius and Eps, 1995; Golan, 2006; Walgrave et al., 2008). The
newspapers were selected based on quality, circulation rates, and pragmatic con-
siderations. The New York Times, the Daily Telegraph and le Figaro are the best-
selling quality papers in the US, Great-Britain, and France with a circulation of
1,865,318; 550,325; and 317,614 respectively (2013 figures). No Russian-language
paper could be included because of a restricted language repertoire which greatly
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reduces the representativeness of the Russian newspapers. The Moscow Times is
Russia’s leading English-language newspaper, published in Moscow since 1992.
It is distributed free of charge to outlets and delivered by subscription to expats,
Russian individuals, and corporate clients. Articles containing the following
words—or their French equivalents—were selected: uprising, rebellion, revolt, revo-
lution, crisis, rebel, fight, war, or civil war and Syria, Syrian, or Assad. Because the
sample covered almost four months, we selected a random sample of 42 days (or
seven constructed weeks, Sundays excluded), which yielded 574 articles. Intercoder
reliability tests (Cohen’s kappa) were conducted on a randomly selected sample of 10
percent of the news articles and ranged between .63 and 1.00 intercoder agreement.
News frame measurement
Generic frames. Ouranalysis of the six generic frames involves 21yes(1)/no(0) questions
based on Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) and Van Cauwenberge et al. (2009). The
conflict frame was measured through four questions on the contentious situation. In
light of our subject the second question was altered: rather than ‘reproach,’ we used
‘fights, riots and confrontation.’ The question whether the story referred to winners or
losers only obtained a factor loading of .29 in Semetko and Valkenburg’s analysis
(2000). However, we obtained a factor loading of .60. The two studies pertain to
very different topics, which probably account for this difference. Unsurprisingly, stor-
ies about European politics do not focus as much on oppositions and fighting as those
about a civil war. The human interest frame was analyzed through four questions on
the extent to which the story was personalized. We did not use Semetko and
Valkenburg’s last question (i.e., presence of visual information in the story?) as the
databases used did not always include visual information. Additionally, three items on
financial impact aswell asmoralmessagesor social prescriptions assessed the economic
impact and morality frames, respectively. The responsibility frame was investigated
through five questions asking who is to blame for the problem. The last question (i.e.,
whether the story suggests the problem requires urgent action) only obtained a factor
loading of .43 in Semetko and Valkenburg’s analysis (2000), while it obtained a factor
loading of .80 in our analysis. Again, the explanationmay be found in the topics under
study: European politics and the introduction of the Euro do not elicit the same level of
urgency as a civil war. Finally the nationalization frame was analyzed through two3
questions about the link between Syria and the country under study.
The extent to which these 21 manifest items reflected the underlying latent con-
structs (i.e., frames) was investigated based on a principal component analysis
(PCA) with Varimax rotation. The framing questions clearly matched one of the
six generic news frames, as can be seen in Table 1, in which the size of the factor
loading indicates the extent to which the question supported the corresponding
frame. The factor analysis shows that all items loaded higher than .53 on one of the
six factors (eigenvalues> 1), explaining almost 60 percent of the variance. Hence,
six multi-item scales were composed for each frame by averaging the scores on the
questions that loaded the factor they were defining. The values of each framing
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Table 1. Varimax-rotated PCA of the 21 framing items.
Factors
Framing items C HI EC M R N
Conflict frame
Does the story revolve around disagree-
ment between parties, individuals,
groups, countries?
.720 .080 .013 .020 .129 .032
Does the story refer to fights, riots, and
confrontation between two or more
parties, individuals, groups, countries?
.743 .119 .066 .097 .053 .157
Does the story refer to two sides or more
than two sides of the problem?
.654 .026 .081 .071 .100 .119
Does the story refer to winners and
losers?
.599 .050 .047 .038 .094 .044
Human interest frame
Does the story provide a human example
or ‘human face’ on the issue?
.081 .811 .016 .056 .035 .050
Does the story employ adjectives or per-
sonal vignettes that generate feelings?
.033 .799 .036 .052 .112 .023
Does the story emphasize how individuals
and groups are affected by the issue/
problem?
.080 .768 .000 .094 .019 .034
Does the story go into the private or
personal lives of the actors?
.029 .804 .014 .043 .050 .002
Economic consequences frame
there a mention of financial losses or gains
now or in the future?
.074 .026 .850 .028 .122 .051
Is there a mention of the costs/degree of
expense involved?
.089 .020 .760 .018 .000 .013
Is there a reference to economic conse-
quences of (not) pursuing a course of
action?
.017 .084 .816 .086 .066 .055
Morality frame
Does the story contain any moral
message?
.087 .009 .014 .755 .191 .126
Does the story make reference to moral-
ity, God, Allah, and other religious
tenets?
.124 .184 .072 .659 .150 .106
Does the story offer specific social pre-
scriptions about how to behave?
.007 .059 .013 .812 .062 .017
(continued)
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scale range from .00 (frame totally not prevalent) to 1.00 (frame totally prevalent).
To measure the internal consistency of the six frame scales we used Cronbach’s
alphas (Kuder–Richardson 20 method for dichotomous data, Cronbach 1990).
Alpha values4 were .62 for the conflict; .80 for the human interest; .75 for the
economic impact; .61 for the morality; .69 for the responsibility; and .73 for the
nationalization frame.
Diagnostic and prognostic framing. All articles were also examined for suggested causes
of and solutions to the Syrian conflict. Based upon a literature study of national
policies and the categories listed by Benford and Snow (2000), we developed six
questions to measure prevalence of possible diagnoses and nine questions to inves-
tigate the prevalence of potential prognoses (see the Appendix). We opted to look
at specific causes and solutions instead of overarching ‘diagnostic/prognostic
Table 1. Continued.
Factors
Framing items C HI EC M R N
Responsibility frame
Does the story suggest that some level of
government has the ability to alleviate
the issue/problem?
.021 .035 .018 .146 .700 .125
Does the story suggest some level of the
government (including President Assad)
is responsible for the issue/problem?
.001 .093 .088 .064 .682 .071
Does the story suggest that an individual
or group of people in society (including
any coalition of the rebels) is respon-
sible for the issue/problem?
.214 .115 .028 .007 .532 .001
Does the story suggest solutions to the
issue/problem?
.012 .072 .031 .088 .748 .080
Does the story suggest the problem
requires urgent action?
.094 .162 .026 .003 .622 .035
Nationalization frame
Does the article mention a connection
between Syria and the individual
country?
.026 .053 .034 .053 .073 .734
Does the article articulate or quote the
ideas of national politicians or persons
that are active on a national level?
.012 .030 .050 .025 .059 .949
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framing’ because this enabled us to draw parallels with the policies implemented by
the countries involved. Journalists can point to political, socio-economic, and reli-
gious factors, violation of human rights, specific triggers (and/or other causes) as
the root of the problem. The rest category was qualitatively examined once more
after pre-coding 18 percent of the articles in order to see if new categories emerged.
As a result, the chemical weapon attack was added as a separate option. Possible
ameliorative steps—hypothetical or actual—could be military action, change in
government, diplomacy, financial intervention, internal reforms, elimination of
the chemical weapon arsenal (and/or other solutions). Again, the rest category
was qualitatively examined after coding in order to see if new categories or sub-
elements emerged. By pre-coding 18 percent of the articles we split the broad
military action frame in three subcategories that were often mentioned (i.e., mili-
tary intervention, opposing military intervention, and military assistance). In so
doing, we ended up with a comprehensive list of possible prognoses. For each cause
of solution, we listed specific elements that needed to be mentioned explicitly in
order to be coded as either diagnostic or prognostic framing.
Results
Agenda-setting: Attention for the conflict
RQ1 asked about the attention paid to the Syrian war with a focus on varying
treatments across the newspapers. Most striking was the substantial number of
articles in the American newspaper (191 articles, 33.3%), the moderate number
of articles in the British and French newspapers (167 and 154 articles, 29.1% and
26.8%), and the low number of articles in the Russian newspapers (62 articles,
10.8%). Attention paid to the Syrian war was not only measured in number of
articles, but also based on their length.5 Generally speaking the stories varied in
length from only nine words (the oil threat mentioned in passing) to 3,658 words,
with an average of 727.75 words (SD¼ 435.37). There were significant differences
among newspapers as to article length, F(3, 570)¼ 30.45, p< .001. On an average,
the New York Times published longer articles (M¼ 956.40, SD¼ 433.23) than any
other newspaper (all p< .001).
A longitudinal analysis of the articles (see Figure 1) highlighted two major shifts
in attention. As could be expected, the sarin gas attack of 21 August 2013 was met
with a huge number of articles: while only 61 were published before 21 August on
the Syrian crisis, there were 513 thereafter. This can be viewed in the light of the
‘key events concept’—extremely severe accidents or catastrophes that significantly
influence news coverage—postulated by Brosius and Eps in 1995. After a while
attention fell back to approximately pre-gas attack levels. One can connect this
decrease in attention with the period that followed the agreement on the elimin-
ation of Syria’s chemical weapon arsenal (14 September 2013). Looking at that
period in more detail (Figure 2), one notices that the Moscow Times was the only
paper that increased its coverage after the agreement. This difference was
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statistically significant (2(3)¼ 46.87, p< .001). This is in line with the fact that
Russia became a major player in the conflict only after it succeeded in facilitating
the agreement- a key diplomatic achievement.
Framing of the Syrian war: Generic news frames
RQ2 investigated the dominant framing of the four newspapers’ coverage of the
Syrian war focusing on possible differences between these newspapers. At first, we
measured the average prevalence of each of the six frames. Our frequency analysis
results showed that the nationalization frame (M¼ .38, SD¼ .43) was by far the
most common, followed by the responsibility frame (M¼ .25, SD¼ .28). The con-
flict frame (M¼ .19, SD¼ .26) was moderately present. The morality frame
(M¼ .13, SD¼ .24) and human-interest frame (M¼ .11, SD¼ .24) were less fre-
quently used (but often together, r¼ .18, p< .001), while the economic impact
frame (M¼ .07, SD¼ .20) was virtually absent.
The second part of the research question asked whether there was any variation
in the framing among the papers. We therefore conducted a MANOVA with the six
Figure 1. Day-by-day evolution of the amount of articles published.
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news frames as within-story factor and the five newspapers as a between-story
factor. This calls for a preliminary remark as the homogeneity of (co)variance
matrices assumption was violated. We may presume that Hotelling’s Trace statistic
will be most robust (Field, 2009). Moreover, because the interpretation of the
significant MANOVAs rested on the interpretation of significant univariate effects,
the adjusted post-hoc tests were used. All relations persist when taking article
length6 into account, unless reported otherwise.
There was a significant impact on frame usage, T2¼ .10, F(18, 1691)¼ 3.00,
p< .001, 2¼ .03. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed
a significant treatment effect on the human interest (F(3, 570)¼ 5.52, p¼ .001,
2¼ .03), economic impact (F(3, 570)¼ 2.93, p< 0.05, 2¼ .02), morality (F(3,
570)¼ 3.42, p< .05, 2¼ .02), and nationalization frame (F(3, 570)¼ 2.82,
p< .05, 2¼ .02). Differences regarding the nationalization frame among the
papers disappeared after controlling for article length, F(3, 569)¼ 2.57, p> .05,
2¼ .01. Human interest-wise post-hoc tests revealed that the Daily Telegraph
used this frame significantly more often than le Figaro or the Moscow Times. It
also stressed more economic impact items compared to le Figaro—even though all
newspapers barely depicted the Syrian conflict in terms of its economic impact.
Figure 2. Day-by-day evolution per newspaper.
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Again, Daily Telegraph reporters used the morality frame more regularly than their
Moscow Times counterparts. The New York Times always held an in-between pos-
ition. There was little evidence of variation in responsibility and conflict framing,
the second and third most used frames by all newspapers. In conclusion, although
all newspapers followed a similar framing pattern, the Daily Telegraph appeared to
make more use of the human interest, economic impact, and morality
frames—especially when compared with le Figaro or the Moscow Times.
As shown by our longitudinal analysis of the numbers of articles, the sarin gas
attack elicited a tremendous response, while coverage decreased again shortly after
the signing of the chemical weapons elimination agreement. Wondering whether
this event might also have changed the framing of the articles, we conducted a
MANOVA with the six news frames as within-story factor and three periods
(before the gas attack vs. between the gas attack and the agreement vs. after the
agreement) as a between-story factor. There was a significant impact of the pub-
lication date on frame usage, T2¼ .13, F(12, 1130)¼ 6.05, p< .001, 2¼ .06.
Univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed a significant treatment
effect on the conflict (F(2, 571)¼ 12.59, p< .001, 2¼ .04), responsibility (F(2,
571)¼ 6.23, p< .01, 2¼ .02), and nationalization frame (F(2, 571)¼ 12.60,
p< .001, 2¼ .04). On average, the conflict frame was used more before the gas
attack than afterwards. The responsibility and nationalization frames were less
frequent both before the gas attack and after the agreement compared with the
period in between, however. While the ANOVA was not significant for the eco-
nomic impact frame, the post-hoc test revealed a similar pattern: more attention
paid to financial impact right after the attack compared to the periods before the
attack or after the agreement. There was little evidence of differences between
periods regarding the morality and human interest frame. All means and standard
deviations can be found in Table 2.
Framing of the Syrian war: Diagnostic and prognostic framing
Diagnoses. RQ3 measures the average prevalence of each diagnosis with a focus on
the differences among newspapers. Journalists quoted a minimum of zero and a
maximum of four possible causes for the continuation of the Syrian conflict. The
vast majority of the articles (68.6%) did not offer any explanation to their readers.
One small fourth of the articles mentioned one cause (24.0%), while less than 10
percent mentioned two or more causes for the continuation of the war. On average,
.41 (SD¼ .69) solutions were mentioned. Frequency analyses showed that, overall,
a particular trigger (M¼ .19, SD¼ .39) was mostly mentioned. However, it was
equally clear that the chemical weapon attack was most frequently cited (as a cause
only for the escalation of the conflict), whereas the specific protests that started the
uprising or the importance of social media as catalyst were hardly mentioned three
years after the protests. Tensions between religious groups or the rise of jihadism
and extremism (M¼ .10, SD¼ .30) were moderately mentioned. Human rights
violations (M¼ .08, SD¼ .27) were less frequently cited, while the articles hardly
14 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)
 at KU Leuven University Library on April 18, 2016gaz.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
T
a
b
le
2
.
M
e
an
s
an
d
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
e
ac
h
fr
am
e
p
e
r
n
ew
sp
ap
e
r
an
d
p
e
ri
o
d
.
L
e
Fi
ga
ro
T
h
e
D
ai
ly
Te
le
gr
ap
h
T
h
e
N
ew
Yo
rk
T
im
e
s
T
h
e
M
o
sc
o
w
T
im
e
s
C
o
n
fli
ct
fr
am
e
M
¼
.2
0
;
SD
¼
.2
8
M
¼
.2
1
;
SD
¼
.2
7
M
¼
.1
7
;
SD
¼
.2
3
M
¼
.1
8
;
SD
¼
.2
6
H
u
m
an
in
te
re
st
fr
am
e
M
¼
.0
6
;
SD
¼
.1
8
M
¼
.1
6
;
SD
¼
.2
7
M
¼
.1
2
;
SD
¼
.2
7
M
¼
.0
4
;
SD
¼
.1
6
E
co
n
o
m
ic
co
n
se
q
u
e
n
ce
s
fr
am
e
M
¼
.0
3
;
SD
¼
.1
4
M
¼
.0
9
;
SD
¼
.2
4
M
¼
.0
7
;
SD
¼
.2
1
M
¼
.0
6
;
SD
¼
.1
5
M
o
ra
lit
y
fr
am
e
M
¼
.1
2
;
SD
¼
.2
3
M
¼
.1
7
;
SD
¼
.2
7
M
¼
.1
1
;
SD
¼
.2
2
M
¼
.0
6
;
SD
¼
.1
6
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
ili
ty
fr
am
e
M
¼
.2
2
;
SD
¼
.2
7
M
¼
.2
7
;
SD
¼
.2
8
M
¼
.2
3
;
SD
¼
.2
8
M
¼
.3
0
;
SD
¼
.3
2
N
at
io
n
al
iz
at
io
n
fr
am
e
M
¼
.3
1
;
SD
¼
.4
1
M
¼
.4
0
;
SD
¼
.4
3
M
¼
.4
1
;
SD
¼
.4
2
M
¼
.3
0
;
SD
¼
.4
3
P
e
ri
o
d
1
P
e
ri
o
d
2
P
e
ri
o
d
3
C
o
n
fli
ct
fr
am
e
M
¼
.3
3
;
SD
¼
.3
3
M
¼
.1
9
;
SD
¼
.2
5
M
¼
.1
4
;
SD
¼
.2
3
H
u
m
an
in
te
re
st
fr
am
e
M
¼
.1
7
;
SD
¼
.3
0
M
¼
.1
0
;
SD
¼
.2
3
M
¼
.1
2
;
SD
¼
.2
6
E
co
n
o
m
ic
co
n
se
q
u
e
n
ce
s
fr
am
e
M
¼
.0
2
;
SD
¼
.0
8
M
¼
.0
8
:
SD
¼
.2
2
M
¼
.0
5
;
SD
¼
.1
7
M
o
ra
lit
y
fr
am
e
M
¼
.1
1
;
SD
¼
.2
3
M
¼
.1
3
;
SD
¼
.2
3
M
¼
.1
0
;
SD
¼
.2
4
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
ili
ty
fr
am
e
M
¼
.1
8
;
SD
¼
.2
5
M
¼
.2
8
;
SD
¼
.2
8
M
¼
.2
0
;
SD
¼
.2
7
N
at
io
n
al
iz
at
io
n
fr
am
e
M
¼
.2
6
;
SD
¼
.4
2
M
¼
.4
4
;
SD
¼
.4
3
M
¼
.2
6
;
SD
¼.
3
7
Godefroidt et al. 15
 at KU Leuven University Library on April 18, 2016gaz.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
touched on the political (M¼ .01, SD¼ .12) and socio-economic causes (M¼ .01,
SD¼ .10).
Did different newspapers mention other causes? [Controlling for article length6]
When looking at the binary category (mention of at least one reason/no mention at
all), a significant association within shorter articles was detected, 2(3)¼ 13.22;
p< .01. The New York Times (40.8%) was more inclined to discuss the reasons
why the Syrian people revolted in comparison with the other newspapers (less than
29.0%). It also mentioned more causes (M¼ .55, SD¼ .81) than the Daily
Telegraph (M¼ .33, SD¼ .55) and e Figaro (M¼ .34, SD¼ .59); F(3, 570)¼ 4.00,
p< .05. The obvious explanation is this newspaper’s longer articles, since the rela-
tionship becomes insignificant after controlling for article length, F(3, 569)¼ .78,
p¼ .503. When looking at specific reasons while controlling for article length, only
the mention of ‘human rights violations’ significantly differed between the news-
papers, and only for short articles, 2(3)¼ 15.18, p¼ .002. In short articles, the New
York Times mentioned human rights violations in Syria (17.8%) proportionally
more than the other newspapers (less than 4.8%). There were no significant asso-
ciations between the newspapers and whether or not they mentioned one or more
political or socio-economic motives, religious prescriptions, or specific triggers.
Did a key event also cause a change in diagnostic framing? [Controlling for
article length6] Although there was no difference in the average number of causes
mentioned, there were some differences between periods as to specific causes.
As could be expected a gas attack was often cited as a cause for the escalation
of the problem after 21 August 2013, mention of which gradually vanished after-
wards, 2(2)¼ 17.48, p< .001. The attack distracted journalists from other possible
causes: religious prescriptions were proportionally more cited before the attack
than afterwards; 2(2)¼ 12.10, p< .01. There were no significant differences
between periods with respect to political aspects, socio-economic causes, human
rights violations, or other unforeseen causes.
Prognoses. RQ4 measures the average prevalence of each prognosis with a focus
on the differences among the newspapers. Journalists quoted a minimum of zero
and a maximum of five possible solutions to the Syrian conflict. One-third of the
articles (30.5%) remained silent about ways to resolve the problem, while most
articles (60.5%) did suggest one or more solutions. One-third mentioned only one
possible solution, while a large 10 percent suggested three or more solutions to
the escalation of the Syrian war. On average 1.20 (M¼ 1.20, SD¼ 1.09) solutions
were mentioned. Our frequency analyses showed that, overall, a military inter-
vention (M¼ .38, SD¼ .49) was seen as the most proper answer to the conflict.
At the same time military action was frequently rejected (M¼ .25, SD¼ .44),
being viewed as bound to worsen things. Diplomacy (M¼ .21, SD¼ .41) was
mentioned as a potential solution almost equally frequently. Journalists made
relatively few mentions of the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons (M¼ .13,
SD¼ .34), followed by military assistance (M¼ .09, SD¼ .29) and a change in
government (M¼ .09, SD¼ .28). There was hardly any mention of financial
16 the International Communication Gazette 0(0)
 at KU Leuven University Library on April 18, 2016gaz.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
intervention (M¼ .02, SD¼ .12) and internal reforms (M¼ .02, SD¼ .12) in the
articles.
Did different newspapers suggest other solutions? [Controlling for article length]6
Although there was no difference as to the average number of solutions suggested,
there were some differences between periods as to the specific solutions. A signifi-
cant association between newspapers and the suggestion of destroying the chemical
weapons was found for short (2(3)¼ 33.76, p< .001) and very long articles
(2(3)¼ 15.81, p¼ .005). The Moscow Times (42.4%, 55.6%) mentioned the dis-
mantling of chemical weapons much more often than the New York Times (11.1%,
16.3%), the Daily Telegraph (8.0%, 4.2%), and le Figaro (6.7%, 0%). This is in line
with the geopolitical stances of the countries involved as Russia insisted on des-
troying the arsenal as a first step towards peace and brokered an agreement with
the help of US Secretary of State John Kerry. The EU largely stayed out of this
discussion. There is also a significant association between a publication and ten-
dency to favor military intervention, 2(3)¼ 14.83, p< .01. Western papers (all
three more than 36.1%) view intervention in a much more positive light than the
Moscow Times (19.4%). When controlling for article length the effect lingers for
short (2(3)¼ 17.70, p¼ .001) and medium-length articles (2(3)¼ 11.81, p< .01).
Additionally, one might have expected the Russian paper to resist military inter-
vention even more, but that medium effect failed to reach significance, 2(3)¼ 4.22,
p¼ .239. There was also no significant difference between newspapers on military
assistance, change in government, diplomatic solutions, internal reforms, and other
unforeseen solutions.
Did a key event also cause a change in prognostic framing? [Controlling for
article length]6 There was a proportionally more frequent mention of at least one
solution right after the attack (2(2)¼ 53.46, p< .001) and the average number of
proposed solutions was also higher right after the gas attack compared to before
the attack or after the agreement (F(2, 634)¼ 11.82, p< .001). When looking at
specific solutions there was a significant association between the periods and the
three military options, 2(2)¼ 103.51, p< .001; 2(2)¼ 23.11, p< .001; 2
(2)¼ 49.57, p< .001. The papers favored intervention after the gas attack
(52.1%) more than before the attack (8.2%) of after the agreement (8.0%). In
contrast, military assistance was suggested more often before the chemical attack
(23.0%) than afterwards (9.0%), almost disappearing as a recommendation after
the agreement (1.6%). Military intervention was also more often rejected after the
gas attack (34.3%) than before it (4.9%) or than after the agreement (8.0%).
Furthermore, there was a significant difference in the number of ‘governmental
change’ solutions suggested in long articles, 2(2)¼ 8.07, p< .05, as such solutions
were suggested more before the gas attack (30.0%) than after it (less than 6.5%).
As expected, dismantling Syria’s chemical weapons was recommended more often
after the chemical weapons elimination agreement had been concluded (42.4%).
The articles did not mention this either before the gas attack (1.6%) or between the
latter and the agreement (5.7%). This difference was also substantial and signifi-
cant, 2(2)¼ 119.03, p< .001. There were no significant differences between the
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periods concerning diplomatic or financial solutions, internal reforms or other
unforeseen options.7
Discussion
Mainstream news media may not only successfully determine what we think, but also
how we think about it. Before scrutinizing possible media effects on the judgments of
people and decisions of policy makers, a content analysis should be made. This study
is one of the first to examine how prominent newspapers in France, Great Britain,
the Us, and Russia covered the Syrian conflict in the period around the chemical
weapons attack of 21 August 2013. By means of a deductive quantitative content
analysis we examined the attention paid to and the framing of the subject with a
focus on differences across newspapers and periods. In addition to shedding light on
generic frames (i.e., conflict, human interest, economic impact, morality, responsi-
bility, and nationalization frame) we looked at the causes and solutions suggested by
the papers in connection with this conflict that started as civil protests against Syrian
strongman Bashar al-Assad and escalated into an all-out civil war. The frame ana-
lysis yielded some interesting findings. As this study only relies on one quality paper
per country and because of the limited representativeness of the English-language
Russian newspaper, other studies should be conducted in order to further interpret
and generalize these findings, and to ascertain if the results found in this study are
country-specific.
First of all, attention paid by the newspapers to the Syrian issue reflected the
geopolitical involvement of their national government. The American newspaper
devoted most attention (in terms of both intensity of coverage and article length) to
the Syrian issue, followed by le Figaro and the Daily Telegraph, which matched the
pivotal role of President Obama in negotiating possible solutions with his French
and British partners. Russia did not play a decisive role in August 2013, which
coincided with a smaller number of articles. Nonetheless the Moscow Times was the
only newspaper paying more attention to the conflict after the agreement, which
goes hand in hand with Russia’s higher involvement after its diplomatic success in
facilitating the agreement. Newspaper attention also intensified after the gas attack
of 21 August 2013—plausibly the most deadly chemical attack since Saddam
Hussein’s 1988 attack—which makes it a ‘key event’ leading to ‘an enormous
amount of coverage’ (Brosius and Eps, 1995: 393). It is notable that the killing
of 100,000 or more human beings with conventional weapons elicits little media
attention, while the deaths of comparatively few from poison gas trigger huge press
coverage and countless reactions on the geopolitical level. Notwithstanding, this is
understandable considering the striking violation of international law by a govern-
ment. The crisis disappeared from the news again once it had been agreed to des-
troy Syria’s chemical stockpile. Arguably the agreement tempered the conflict. Less
conflict induces less coverage as ‘conflict will be emphasized, conciliation not’
(Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 84) and thus subsequent events had less news value
(Gans, 1979).
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Second, when covering the Syrian conflict journalists mainly related the issue to
their own country and the ideas of their politicians and citizens. Ethnocentrism has
often been identified as an important news value for foreign news (Gans, 1979) but
it appears to be a dominant news frame too. The responsibility frame—reflecting
efforts to assign blame or seek solutions—was also well represented, possibly influ-
encing readers’ perspective on who was responsible. One may thus argue that
newspapers can still be viewed as the Fourth Estate playing a crucial role in the
management of a representative democracy by holding politicians accountable. To
a somewhat lesser extent the papers reported the issue through a conflict lens,
reflecting the disagreements among the major players in the crisis. The frequent
use of the nationalization, responsibility, and conflict frames is in keeping with
previous research on other topics (e.g., Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Van
Cauwenberge et al., 2009), but also with studies about the Arab Spring (e.g.,
Cozma and Kozman, 2015; Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012). Despite the sarin gas
attack causing a high number of casualties and being recognized as a war crime,
our study found barely any morality or human-interest frames (to be expected in
the coverage of chemical mass killings and civil wars). This could be due to an
inability of the journalists to identify with the Syrians, a group of people from a
faraway country with hardly any historical or contemporary relations with one of
the countries involved (Cozma and Kozman, 2015). Another explanation could be
that journalists often rely on quotes while using such frames owing to the need to
appear objective (Neuman et al., 1992; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). Because of
the dangers inherent to a war—also for journalists—the most useful sources were
not interviewed. It is quite troubling that both our research and Semetko and
Valkenburg’s landmark study (2000) failed to find a high occurrence of the mor-
ality frame. An important question is whether the morality frame should be con-
sidered at all in future research. The goal of content analysis is to find a pattern of
frequently used frames as a first step in media effect research. But if a frame is
barely used, will it still have impact? Several studies already opted to exclude the
morality frame (e.g., De Vreese et al., 2001; Van Cauwenberge et al., 2009).
Furthermore, journalists barely mentioned any economic impact—notwithstand-
ing the large investments of all authorities involved and the economics of a war.
This conclusion is in sharp contrast with those of previous studies (e.g., Semetko
and Valkenburg 2000; Van Cauwenberge et al., 2009) and it challenges the generic
character of the economic impact frame. One may wonder whether this frame is
still applicable in an international, disputed, and violent context. In general, all our
frames were not as present as in other studies: average scores of .60 (Semetko and
Valkenburg, 2000) or even .87 (Van Cauwenberge et al., 2009) versus a
highest score of .37 in our case study. This raises questions about the applicabil-
ity of generic frames, but further research should be carried out in order to firmly
investigate this.
Although all newspapers show this pattern in their coverage, the Daily Telegraph
seems to be the most prominently framed one (in terms of human interest, moral-
ity, and economic impact), especially when compared with le Figaro or the Moscow
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Times. In addition, the period also influenced the tone of reporting as the conflict
per se took a back seat to national interests, responsibility, and economic impact in
the wake of the sarin gas attack. Focus on national interests, responsibility and
economic impact gradually disappeared again when the press went back to routine
reporting after the agreement on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.
Third, the context was barely outlined three years after the first protests, as a
vast majority of the articles did not mention any cause for the conflict. One may
then wonder how (or whether) readers are supposed to understand the conflict.
Moreover, the gas attack led to even more episodic framing as it shifted coverage
from more contextual causes to the actual attack. This is at odds with Cozma and
Kozman’s finding (2015) that 98% of the New York Times stories were themat-
ically framed. However, this could be due to their crude distinction between and
yes/no-coding of episodic and thematic frames, or to their limited sample (93
articles). In contrast, various solutions were put forward. While military inter-
vention was recommended the most, such a solution was also highly disputed
evidencing indecisiveness and discrepancies at the geopolitical level. Diplomacy
was almost as often advised as a possible solution. A change in government was
suggested less frequently, while financial intervention and internal reforms hardly
seem to have been considered at all. This is in contrast with the large economic
pressure put on the Assad regime, and it could distort readers’ understanding by
leading them to underestimate their country’s economic efforts. Differences
among the newspapers reflected the varying political reactions. Western news-
papers called for military intervention more often than the Russian paper, which
focused more on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. After the sarin gas
attack, and in keeping with the political climate, debate on the merits of military
intervention intensified as such a solution was more often suggested and rejected.
Once the chemical weapons elimination agreement had been signed the papers
also focused on this first step towards peace instead of suggesting other possible
solutions.
A reader’s picture of the Syrian war will vary according to her/his national daily
of choice as well as the period under consideration. This picture is largely congru-
ent with the developments on the geopolitical level. The question then is as follows:
what is the impact of such framing on public understanding and judgment of the
issue and actors? Does the regular use of the nationalization frame increase peo-
ple’s involvement? Or does the lack of human interest or morality frames lead to
indifference towards the conflict? Does a lack of diagnostic framing cause a lack of
knowledge? Another question that may be raised is whether the media just follow
geopolitical events, are manipulated by governments or exert an influence on gov-
ernments as well. Or are journalists and politicians part and parcel of one single
culture, thus stressing the very same aspects of any topic since they share the same
cultural repertoire? Were frames consciously chosen by journalists or were they
present only because the corresponding themes happened to be mentioned by the
sources? While such questions were beyond the scope of this content analysis, they
delineate an interesting angle for future research.
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Notes
1. Great Britain and France joined the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ in Syria, especially
after the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015. There is still no European
consensus on intervention in Syria, however (2015).
2. Please note that we focus on one single case (coverage of the Syrian war in 2013), which makes
it impossible to give a conclusive answer to this question. Nonetheless, the study provides a
first indication on the genericness of the frames outside a European, mostly economic, context.
3. It is true that three questions is generally considered the minimum for a factor analysis.
However, we replicated the study of Van Cauwenberge et al. (2009) and they used only
two questions to measure their frame.
4. Caution is recommended when talking about our results as  is not always>.70. However,
Nunnally (1978) stated that ‘time and energy can be saved in early stages of research by
working with instruments that have only modest reliability.’ Moreover,  values between
.60 and .70 are not uncommon in framing research (e.g., Lance et al., 2006).
5. Tables with the number and length of articles for each newspaper are available upon
request with the corresponding author.
6. Because word length played a sufficient and significant role, we included word length as a
covariate in the analyses. In order to do so, we computed a variable with three categories: less
than the average of 697 words, between 698 and 1,000 words and more than 1,001 words.
7. One concluding remark should be made about the above analyses (of the diagnostic and
prognostic frames), as not all cells had more than five items. Most cells did include
enough items, but caution in interpreting these results remains advisable.
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Appendix
Diagnostic and prognostic framing
Diagnoses
Political causes Does the article mention corruption, a lack of political freedom,
and/or unfair elections as a (possible) cause of the Syrian
conflict?
Socio-economic causes Does the article mention inflation, rising unemployment, poverty
or a lack of prosperity, limited educational opportunities, and/
or generation gap between young and old Syrians as a (possible)
cause of the continuation/escalation of the Syrian conflict?
Human rights violations Does the article mention infringement or lack of the freedom of
speech, opinion, religion, equal rights or human rights in gen-
eral, and/or war crimes against civilization or the violation of
international law as a (possible) cause of the continuation/
escalation of the Syrian conflict?
Religious prescriptions Does the article mention extremists or jihadists, disagreement
between diverse religious groups, and/or the character or cul-
ture of religious groups as a (possible) cause of the continua-
tion/escalation of the Syrian conflict?
Particular triggers Does the article mention the brutal arrest of the boys of Daraa,
movement through social media, the many (innocent, civilian)
victims and/or a chemical weapons attack as a (possible) cause
of the continuation/escalation of the Syrian conflict?
Others This is a residual category for unforeseen causal elements.
Prognoses
Military action
Intervention Does the article mention suppressing the fights with action by
their military and/or a no-fly zone as a (possible) solution of the
Syrian conflict?
Assistance Does the article only mention military assistance as a (possible)
solution of the continuation/escalation of the Syrian conflict?
Rejection Does the article mention that any military action is rejected or will
only deteriorate the Syrian conflict?
Change in government Does the article mention the dismissal of President Bashar al-
Assad or his entire regime and/or the appointment of a new
government as a (possible) solution of the continuation/esca-
lation of the Syrian conflict?
Financial intervention Does the article mention economic cooperation with other
countries of the international community to provide financial
(continued)
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Continued.
Diagnoses
support and/or economic measures against one or more par-
ties involved as a (possible) solution of the continuation/esca-
lation of the Syrian conflict?
Internal reforms Does the article mention internal reforms in terms of political
issues, socio-economic issues, religious issues, and/or the
improvement of human rights as a (possible) solution of the
continuation/escalation of the Syrian conflict?
Dismantling chemical
weapons
Does the article mention internal the destruction of the Syrian
stockpile of chemical weapons as a (possible) solution of the
continuation/escalation of the Syrian conflict?
Others This is a residual category for unforeseen remedial elements.
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